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Abstract
Within Australia’s federal system, responsibility for preventing, preparing for, responding to and recovering from natu-
ral disasters is shared between the three tiers of government. Intergovernmental policy and funding arrangements are
premised on shared responsibility and aim to foster individual, business and community resilience. These arrangements
underpin Australia’s international reputation for effectiveness in its management of natural disasters. The capacity of the
diverse networks that comprise the disaster management system to coordinate and deliver in the preparedness and re-
sponse phases of a disaster, and to provide relief in the immediate aftermath, has been developed over time and tested
and refined through the experience of frequent, severe disaster events over recent decades. Less well developed is the
system’s ability to support economic recovery in disaster-affected communities over the longer term. This paper presents
case studies of regional communities affected by two of Australia’s most expensive and deadly natural disasters—the
2009 Victorian bushfires and the cyclones and floods that struck the state of Queensland in 2010–2011. It highlights sig-
nificant gaps in policy and funding arrangements to support recovery and offers lessons for aligning recovery within a
resilience framework.
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1. Introduction
Natural disasters are inherent to Australia’s climate, ge-
ography and environment. Disaster events span the spec-
trum of hazards from bushfire, cyclone and earthquake
to flood, heatwave and storm surge. Since 2009, natu-
ral disasters have wrought damage and destruction to
life, infrastructure, private property and the natural envi-
ronment across the states and territories. The estimated
total economic costs of natural disasters was calculated
to have been AUD$9 billion (USD$6.9 billion) in 2015.1
Some reports predict this may increase to as much as
AUD$33 billion (USD $25.5 billion) per year by 2050 as
the impacts of climate change increase (Deloitte Access
Economics, 2016, p. 2). Australia follows the compre-
hensive approach to disaster management, which com-
prises the phases of prevention2, preparation, response
and recovery (the PPRR framework) and addresses all
hazards. Within Australia’s federal system, responsibil-
ity for preventing, preparing for, responding to and re-
covering from natural disasters is shared between the
three tiers of government. Intergovernmental policy and
funding arrangements are premised on shared respon-
sibility and, since 2001, have aimed to foster individual,
1 Currency conversions to USD are calculated at the prevailing exchange rate for the period in question.
2 By ‘prevention’ we mean ‘mitigation’ as it is the more common technical term used around the world.
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business and community resilience. Less well developed,
however, is the system’s ability to support economic re-
covery in disaster-affected communities and to embed
resilience over the longer term (see, for example, Mc-
Gowan, 2014; McGowan & Tiernan, 2014).
This article responds to calls for more holistic ap-
proaches to disasters and in particular, economic recov-
ery. It draws on the findings of a major study of the expe-
riences of economic recovery practices in regional com-
munities affected by two of Australia’s most expensive
and deadly natural disasters—the 2009 Victorian bush-
fires and the cyclones and floods that struck the state of
Queensland in 2010–2011 (Regional Australia Institute
[RAI], 2013). Our case studies highlight significant gaps
in policy and funding arrangements to support recovery.
We identified a disconnect between the experience and
lessons learned from disaster recovery and prevention
and preparedness. Indeed, we found that actions and
decisions of policy-makers taken in the immediate after-
math of a disaster had the unintended consequence of
undermining individual and community resilience over
the longer term.
Since resilience remains the core policy intent, we
offer lessons for how Australia’s disaster governance
arrangements, and those of other countries, might be
amended to embrace ‘adaptive resiliency’—‘the ability
to adapt through the redevelopment of the community
in ways that reflect the community’s values and goals,
and its evolving understanding of the external forceswith
which it must contend’ (Kapucu, Hawkins, & Rivera, 2013,
p. 357). We conclude that the ‘structural’ or ‘engineer-
ing approach’ to resilience has become predominant in
Australia’s disaster governance, leading to a primary fo-
cus on reconstruction during the recovery phase post-
disaster. Our case studies demonstrate the imperative for
a greater focus on ‘non structural’ resilience, in particular
the ‘community capital’ that can be brought to bear, to
develop adaptive capacity and adaptive resilience.
In the context of this thematic issue, which is fo-
cused on promoting community resilience through dis-
aster policies and governance, this article offers empiri-
cal support for the ‘adaptive resiliency framework’ pro-
posed by Kapucu et al. (2013, p. 356). A key element of
their framework is ‘integrating learning and adaptation
into the traditional phases of disaster management’.
2. Disaster Recovery: An Overview of Policy Issues in
Australian Arrangements
Government funded disaster relief in Australia operates
within the framework of the Natural Disaster Relief and
Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA) (Attorney-Generals De-
partment, 2012). The NDRRA framework establishes cost
sharing arrangements between the State and Federal
Governments as well as specifying eligible expenditure
activities. Since 2007 the NDRRA has included provision
to redevelop eligible public infrastructure to a higher,
more resilient standard. Known as the principle of ‘bet-
terment’, this provision provided—at least in theory—
the link between recovery and mitigation against fu-
ture disasters (McGowan, 2014). Its adoption was in-
tended to align with the goal of improving community
resilience, formalized in the National Strategy for Disas-
ter Resilience 2011 (NSDR).
Despite numerous disasters requiring reconstruction
and spiralling expenditures under NDRRA (see Produc-
tivity Commission, 2014), only limited use has been
made of the betterment provision. Until 2012 when the
Queensland Government instituted a AUD$40 million
(USD$40.9 million) fund that was matched by the Fed-
eral Government, the only successful application had
been for a community pool betterment program in re-
gional NSW (Productivity Commission, 2014). This re-
mains an area of significant policy contention between
the Commonwealth and State governments. Extraordi-
nary increases in NDRRA expenditure—approximately
AUD$12 billion (USD$10.7 million) from 2009–2013 can
be contrasted with investments in mitigation under the
Natural Disaster Resilience Program (NDRP) that totalled
AUD$100 million (USD$89 million) over the same period
(McGowan & Tiernan, 2014, p. 8).
In 2013 then Commonwealth Treasurer, Joe Hockey,
tasked the Productivity Commission with responsibility
for conducting a comprehensive review, including of cost-
sharing principles and the apparent ‘weighting’ of Com-
monwealth funding towards recovery. The Commission
was asked to ‘take into account the priority of effective
mitigation to reduce the impact of disasters on commu-
nities’ (Productivity Commission, 2014, p. iv). At the time
of writing, the Commonwealth government has acknowl-
edged receipt of the report, but has not made a formal
policy response to its recommendations.
Whilst these challenges, and the original impetus
for the research project, arose in the context of Aus-
tralian disaster management policy, they are not unique
to Australia. A series of reports has identified the grow-
ing costs of disaster recovery and reconstruction around
the world, all calling for an increased emphasis on build-
ing resilience to minimise the costs, both human and fi-
nancial, of disasters and subsequent recovery. The re-
search presented in this paper was conducted within
the context of disaster resilience frameworks that are
broadly applicable to all communities, with one impor-
tant caveat that has implications for generalizability. That
is, that it was conducted in Australia—a broadly stable,
advanced democracy characterized by sound principles
of governance and accountability. Thus, questions of
state stability are not considered in our discussion of re-
silient communities.
3. Literature Review
3.1. Resilience Frameworks
In recent years, the concept of resilience has gained
currency in disaster management policy. Originating in
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ecology and psychology, resilience is envisaged by some
scholars as both an outcome and the process by which
actors, ranging from individuals, to families to communi-
ties, positively adapt to changing environments (Norris,
Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008). Re-
silience is an important concept across fields as diverse
as health planning, engineering and ecology, to eco-
nomic development and social science (see Rose, 2009).
Other definitions understand resilience as a system char-
acteristic. For Holling (1973, p. 14), resilience is a ‘mea-
sure of the persistence of systems and their ability to ab-
sorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same
relationships between populations or state variables’. In
various parts of the literature, the changes and distur-
bances to a system are called stressors, which Norris et
al. (2008, p. 131) define as ‘aversive circumstances that
threaten the well-being or functioning of the individual,
organization, neighbourhood, community, or society’.
Numerous resiliencemodels showadisaster-impacted
community experiencing a period of interruption followed
by a progressive return to an equilibrium point (Cutter,
2009; Norris et al., 2008; Zhou, Wang, Wan, & Jia, 2010).
Positive adaptation in the face of a disaster shock incor-
porates individuals rapidly recovering their wellbeing post-
disaster, as well as communities returning to a high, or
higher, level of functioning. In achieving a high level of
adapted functioning post-disaster, communities are able
to develop greater resources to mitigate the impact of fu-
ture disasters (Berkes & Ross, 2012; Zhou et al., 2010).
The more recent concept of ‘adaptive resilience’ is
concerned with a ‘community’s behaviour after the dis-
aster’, and how to best support ‘community-level activi-
ties [that] focus on returning social, economic, and envi-
ronmental conditions to their previous state’ (Kapucu et
al., 2013, p. 356). This approach seeks to integrate under-
standings of resilience, and practices for its promotion,
from a number of different fields. Inter-disciplinary per-
spectives are needed to support ‘adaptive resilience’, be-
cause, as Tierney (2013, p. xiv) notes, it is present in all as-
pects of the system’s way of dealing with hazard events:
“Resilience is a key element in all phases of what
is traditionally framed as the ‘hazards cycle’: miti-
gation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Prior
to disaster, anticipatory resilience consists of activ-
ities that enable communities to assess risks, form
communities of interest, exercise foresight, and en-
act mitigation and preparedness measures to man-
age risks. When disasters strike, responsive resilience
makes it possible for social and organisational enti-
ties to mobilise resources through emergent interper-
sonal and inter-organisational networks, to carry out
plans, and to improvise and exercise creativity in in-
stances where plans fall short. After disaster, adaptive
resilience enables social units to reassess their circum-
stances, learn from their disaster experiences, and ad-
just their strategies in light of the ‘new normal’ ush-
ered in by disaster.”
The most comprehensive description of adaptive re-
silience is provided by Kapucu et al. (2013) (see Figure 1).
The community, or social units, are key to the
adaptive resilience framework. In these processes, the
‘community participates fully in the recovery process
and…has the capacity, skills and knowledge to make its
participation meaningful’ (Coles & Buckle, 2004, p. 6).
Adaptive governance processes become crucial. Indeed,
Shaw (2013, p. 220) notes ‘it is increasingly observed and
agreed that a sustainable [disaster risk reduction] activ-
ity is only possible when there is a strong involvement
and commitment from the local institutions’.
3.2. Issues in Economic Recovery for Regional and Rural
Communities
Extensive research in the United States points to a strong
inter-relationship between business recovery and popu-
lation return post-disaster (Dahlhamer & Tierney, 1998;
Vigdor, 2008; Webb, Tierney, & Dahlhamer, 2002; Xiao
& Van Zandt, 2012; Zhang, Lindell, & Prater, 2009). Keep-
ing residents in the local region, and assisting those dis-
placed to return, is critical to business recovery. As Xiao
and Van Zandt (2012) identified, the return of businesses
to an area acts as a pull factor to the return of local res-
idents. The problem of population displacement and re-
turn and its link to business return post-disaster is a vari-
ant of the collective action dilemma in which every indi-
vidual’s choice is influenced by the choices of other indi-
viduals (Storr & Haeffele-Balch, 2012). From the perspec-
tive of displaced residents, a key factor in the decision to
return to a disaster-affected region is the extent to which
businesses commit to rebuild and re-open. Research sug-
gests that this relationship is more heavily weighted to-
wards businesses reopening, meaning that business re-
opening will pull residents back into a disaster affected
region (Xiao & Van Zandt, 2012).
The boom of local economic activity driven by re-
construction is frequently a mirage that masks a longer-
term decrease in population and broader business per-
formance issues (see Hayashi, 2012; Vigdor, 2008). An-
other aspect of the ‘reconstruction mirage’ faced in re-
covering communities is the focus on building ‘things’
to demonstrate commitment and action (Handmer &
Hillman, 2004; Rietveld, Simms, & Sparrow, 2001). This
theory, where economic development is presumed to
flow from possessing or building things, is most fre-
quently seen in practice in developing countries (Hand-
mer & Dovers, 2007; Jacobs, 2000). The focus on build-
ing ‘things’ tends to drive a significant influx of construc-
tionworkers to the affected region (Vigdor, 2008). The re-
construction boom often distorts measures of a region’s
economic performance and obscures the long-term chal-
lenges faced in achieving sustained economic recovery
(Hayashi, 2012; Vigdor, 2008). Hayashi (2012, p. 190)
noted this trend in relation to the 1995 Kobe earthquake
recovery, observing Kobe’s ‘economy slid into a long de-
cline, except for the short period during which recon-
Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 74–86 76
Capital
Vulnerability
Stressor
Avoidance
Disaster
Losses
Adapve
Capacity**
Bounce Back
(reconstruct)
(Engineering
Resilience)
Adapt
(redevelop)
(Adapve
Resilience)
Recovery
Response
Community
Capital*
Non-proﬁt
Private Support
Federal, State, Local,
Police & Support
Community
Migaon &
Preparedness
Hazard
Exposure
HAZARD
EVENT
* Elements of Community Capital:
• Social capital eg. Local organisaons,
• networks etc
• Human capital eg. Knowledge
• Economic capital
• Natural capital eg. wetaInds
** Adapve Capacity — Ability to
engage in adapve management and
learning through an adapve
governance process.
Ecological
Mediators
Stressor
Resistance
Figure 1. Adaptive resiliency framework. Source: Kapucu et al. (2013, p. 356).
struction spending provided a temporary boost’. NewOr-
leans demonstrated the same pattern, with the construc-
tion sector being the only industry sector that did not
suffer employment losses after Hurricane Katrina (Vig-
dor, 2008).
4. Methodology
4.1. Approach
This research was conducted through a case study ap-
proach. We used techniques drawn from the broad
toolkit of interpretive policy analysis (Bevir & Rhodes,
2015; Rhodes, 2011). The method focuses on beliefs and
practices; it is concerned with the meaning ascribed to
experiences by those involved and seeks to recover their
stories. A case study approach is useful when focusing on
contemporary events as it enables an up-close interpre-
tation of events through the interviews with people di-
rectly involved in those events. How disaster participants
construct themeaning of eventsmatters as this construc-
tion of a community’s shared understanding of a disas-
ter influences its resilience in future events (Alkon, 2004).
As Alkon (2004, p. 147) notes ‘Stories matter. Place mat-
ters. And stories affect place’. The importance of narra-
tive and storytelling arises as the construction of mean-
ing is an inherently subjective activity (Alkon, 2004; Riess-
man, 2008). The case study approach was therefore se-
lected as it allowed researchers to ask explanatory ‘how’
and ‘why’ questions (Yin, 2009, p. 4).
The case studies were developed through a struc-
tured process of consultation and engagement to iden-
tify appropriate interviewees. In each of the case study
locations, the research team first met with represen-
tatives of the local Council and the Chamber of Com-
merce to seek support for the project and identify inter-
viewees. The research team also met with members of
Community Associations and, in Cardwell, with the CEO
of the Girringun Aboriginal Corporation. Researchers vis-
ited each of the case study locations to conduct inten-
sive fieldwork, involving semi-structured, qualitative in-
terviews.
4.2. Case Study Locations
The case study locations were selected as they had all
suffered significant impacts in the various natural disas-
ters. Eachwas formally declared a State of Disaster under
the relevant policy frameworks. Further, due to the ex-
tensive damages arising from the events, major recovery
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efforts were undertaken at local and state government
levels through specially constituted reconstruction bod-
ies. This formalised approach ensured that extensive doc-
umentary evidence of the process of recovery was pro-
duced and retained by relevant government agencies.
The article presents the data from three regional cen-
tres impacted by natural disasters:
Marysville and Triangle, Victoria, Australia—‘Black
Saturday’ bushfires on 7 February 2009;
Emerald, Queensland, Australia—Southern and cen-
tral Queensland floods in 2010–2011;
Cardwell, Queensland, Australia—Tropical cyclone
Yasi, 2011.
The research team developed socio-economic profiles
of each community pre and post disaster (see Table 1).
These provided a baseline for comparison, and also high-
lighted the range of businesses present in each commu-
nity. We sought interviews with a broadly representative
sample of community and business leaders from across
the spectrum of industries. In Cardwell, researchers con-
ducted 18 interviews with representatives of industry,
business owners, the local Chamber of Commerce, com-
munity development association, the Mayor and Coun-
cil representatives. In Emerald, the research team con-
ducted 18 interviews and a further 22 interviews were
conducted in Marysville (total n = 58). Each interview
lasted approximately an hour and follow up focus groups
were conducted in each location, over a two to three
hour period, to discuss the preliminary findings.
4.3. Data Analysis
To ensure the case study was rigorous, a comprehen-
sive review of available data and literature was under-
taken to provide context to the interview outputs and
establish a baseline for analysis (Yin, 2009). In addition
to the socio-economic profiles for each case study loca-
tion noted above, desktop research included reviewing
post disaster reports generated by key local groups such
as the local Council, Chambers of Commerce and recon-
struction authorities. This background research also in-
volved requesting the local Councils to complete a com-
prehensive survey on the impacts of the disaster on the
local area and local approaches to recovery.
The qualitative data collected through interviews
were analysed using thematic analysis. The interviews
were recorded, transcribed and reviewed by the project
team. The thematic analysis was undertaken through
an emergent inductive approach that sought to identify
and draw out themes from the data (Lofland, Snow, An-
derson, & Lofland, 2006). An iterative process of cod-
ing was undertaken, seeking first to identify key issues,
shared and divergent narratives; and second to review
and clarify the emerging analytic themes (Lofland et
al., 2006). Different members of the research team re-
viewed and clarified the thematic analysis as part of an
iterative process. Themes were then analysed in light
of the existing models of community resilience and re-
covery (Cutter et al., 2008; Norris et al., 2008). Focus
groups were subsequently conducted with key commu-
nity leaders to reflect on the findings, ‘ground truth’ the
data and identify additional information not elicited dur-
ing the interviews.
5. Case Studies of Economic Recovery in Regional
Australia
5.1. Marysville Case Study—Black Saturday Bushfires,
7 February 2009
The Marysville Triangle consists of the small communi-
ties ofMarysville, Buxton, Narbethong and Taggety in the
Shire of Murrindindi, about 100 km (62miles) north-east
ofMelbourne. The area’s economy is based on its natural
environment. In addition to tourism, the main industries
are agriculture, aquaculture, timber and sawmilling. The
Black Saturday bushfires were a series of individual bush-
fires that burnt across Victoria on Saturday 7 February
2009. The fires resulted in Australia’s highest ever loss of
life from a bushfire, with 173 fatalities. 414 people were
injured, 2,133 homes were destroyed, 78 townships af-
fected, over 4,500 km2 (2,796 miles2) burned, leaving
7,500 people homeless.
Marysville and the surrounding areas suffered the
greatest losses, with 39 people killed (35 Marysville,
4 Narbethong). Of the 452 homes that existed in Marys-
Table 1. Attributes of case study communities.* Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics ([ABS] 2006, 2011).
Marysville Emerald Cardwell
2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011
Population 517 223 10,998 12,895 1,252 1,176
Median Age 46 52 28 29 47 52
Median Income per Week $974 $880 $1,805 $2,477 $855 $1,004
Unemployment 5.5% 11.9% 1.9% 2.4% 4.7% 5.5%
* Data obtained are Urban Centres and Localities (UCLs) which are an aggregate of Statistical Area 1s (SA1s). They describe populations
over 200 people. Urban Centres are areas with a core population greater than 1,000 people. Localities are areas with a population over
200 people and a core urban population less than 1,000 people. Median income is displayed in AUD$.
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ville prior to the fires, only 34 remained habitable. Fire
damage forced the closure of key tourist attractions in-
cluding Lake Mountain. Almost all the shops and cafés
and restaurantswere lost. Essential services inMarysville
including the police station, the post office, community
centre, medical centre, retirement village and the pri-
mary school were destroyed.
5.1.1. Economic Impact
The total value of tourism to the Marysville economy
was estimated at AUD$33 million (USD$35 million) per
year of which ‘visitors’ to the area contributed about
AUD$28 million (USD$30 million) per year (Boston Con-
sulting Group [BCG], 2009, p. 18). With accommodation
and tourism the major industry in the Marysville area,
only 200 beds of an estimated 1500 remained available.
The large majority of Marysville and Triangle’s busi-
nesses are ‘micro’ businesses with revenues of less than
AUD$200k (USD$214,000) per annum. Their economic
recovery has been difficult. For example, the general
store did not open for nearly 10 months after the fires.
A year on, the Marysville region still did not have a ser-
vice station operating to supply petrol to local residents.
The immediate damage caused by the fires resulted
in extensive displacement of the location population. Of
the 90% of the population who lost their homes, over
50% have not returned to the region. In addition to
the reduction in population since the Black Saturday
fires, the age profile has changed dramatically. In 2006,
Marysville’s age profile showed 36% aged 55 years and
over compared to 24% for Australia. By 2011, nearly 47%
were aged 55 years and older. The median age in 2006
of 46 years had increased to 52 in 2011. The data reflects
the loss of business and employment opportunities and
the need for younger workers to move away in search
of employment.
The unemployment rate increased dramatically from
5.5% in 2006 to 11.9% in 2011. Only 90 people indicated
in the 2011 Census that they were employed and nearly
half of these were working part-time or casually. Median
weekly rental increased from $135 in 2006 to $350 in
2011 as a result of severe shortages in rental accommo-
dation caused by the Black Saturday fires. In 2006 there
were 65 rental accommodation units. There were only
nine in 2011.
5.2. Emerald Case Study—2010–2011 Flooding
Emerald is the major centre within the Central Highlands
Regional Council, approximately 300 km (186miles) west
of the regional city of Rockhampton. Emerald’s econ-
omy is based on mining and agriculture. Emerald was
flooded twice in December 2010. On 3 December, Emer-
ald was isolated when the flooding peaked at 10.95 me-
tres (35.92 feet) at the Vince Lester Bridge. The second
flooding peaked on 31 December at 16.05 metres (52.66
feet), surpassing the 1950 record of 15.7 metres (49.44
feet). Again Emerald was isolated; this time for 11 days.
The town itself was cut in half for seven days.
In Emerald, it was estimated that 1060 residences
had water over the floor. 2,500 people were evacuated
from their homes with more than 400 staying in one of
four evacuation centres at the height of the flooding. It
was also estimated that over 100 (90%) buildings in the
industrial area and approximately 30% of commercial of-
fices were impacted by flood waters.
5.2.1. Economic Impact
The impacts of the flood were largely felt by small and
medium businesses in Emerald Township and the sur-
rounding region. 341 businesses of a total of 386 or 80%
of Emerald’s businesses were impacted. In the regional
council area, 88% of businesses affectedwere in Emerald
itself (Central Highlands Regional Council, 2011). Accord-
ing to the Economic Impact report, the total estimated
cost of direct damages to businesses (excluding mining)
across the Central Highlands as a result of the flood-
ing was AUD$313.6 million (USD$336.1 million) (Central
Highlands Regional Council, 2011).
45.5% of businesses that were forced to close re-
opened within a week, while a further 19.7% opened
again within two weeks. The average length of time to
reopening was 25.2 days.
In the agricultural sector there was major damage
to irrigation infrastructure, fencing, plant and equipment
and crops and livestock with 35 primary producers in
the Emerald service area reporting significant damage.
The Economic Impact report assessed that the aver-
age cost of repairing infrastructure, equipment and/or
replacing stock losses per property as a result of the
2010–2011 flooding was approximately AUD$306,992
(USD$329,034).
Access to the mine sites from Emerald was cut for an
extended period, and as production was haltedmine site
operators declared ‘Force Majeure’ to mitigate claims
from customers. However, despite this being a more se-
rious flood than 2008, coal mining representatives who
were interviewed agreed that the lessons learnt enabled
them to be back in production within eight days, com-
pared with 11–14 days in 2008.
5.3. Cardwell Case Study—Tropical Cyclone Yasi 2011
Cardwell is a small coastal community of about 1,200peo-
ple, located within the Cassowary Coast Regional Coun-
cil area of north Queensland. Cardwell’s major industries
are agriculture (bananas and sugar) and tourism. There
is a significant indigenous population in the town. A Cat-
egory 5 Tropical Cyclone, Yasi made landfall near Mission
Beach just north of Cardwell in the early morning of 2
February 2011. Tropical Cyclone Yasi was accompanied
by gale force winds with gusts recorded of over 250km/h
(155 miles/h). Heavy rain and strong winds were accom-
panied by a 5 metre (16 foot) storm surge at Cardwell.
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The combined action of the heavy rains, gale force
winds and the storm surge resulted in approximately 75%
of the buildings in the town suffering damage. The storm
surge was a major contributor to the destruction, partic-
ularly at Port Hinchinbrook, on the foreshore and build-
ings and facilities along and on the eastern side of the
main highway.
The town was isolated as fallen trees and debris
blocked the road and cut off both sides of the highway, pre-
venting the return of residents for four to five days. Power,
telecommunications and water were all compromised.
5.3.1. Economic Impact
Following Tropical Cyclone Yasi, Cardwell’s estimated res-
ident population declined slightly from 1,252 in 2006 to
1,176 in 2011. Furthermore, its median age increased
from 47 years to 52 years between 2006 and 2011. It
has a much older age profile than the rest of the coun-
try, with 44.4% being aged 55 years and older compared
to the national population age profile of 25.6% aged 55
years and older. This aging population is also reflected in
the industry data with 12.4% working in the ‘health care
and social assistance’ sector (up from 9.0% in 2006).
Tropical Cyclone Yasi made these challenges all the
more difficult. All businesses in the town were impacted,
many for more than 12 months. Some still had not re-
covered 26 months after the event. The loss of cash flow
from sales was exacerbated by the costs of the clean-up,
repairs and rebuilding. Limited supplies reduced ability
to provide services in the immediate aftermath.
The tourist industry was devastated with consequent
‘flow-on’ effects to the tourism-related businesses. The
regional value of tourism was valued at AUD$104million
(USD$111 million) per annum. The Census data shows
that in the category of Food and Accommodation the
workforce has dropped from 12.3% in 2006 to 9.3% in
2011. The post-disaster reconstruction activity changed
the employment profile. According to the 2011 Census,
13.5% of people are working in the Construction sector,
up from 8.8% in 2006.
Local farming and aquaculture suffered immediate
and ongoing damage from Tropical Cyclone Yasi, due to
extensive crop loss, damage and destruction of mature
trees and farm infrastructure. The loss of the season’s
crop, combined with extensive repair expenses had neg-
ative impacts across this sector.
6. Case Study Findings
In this section we present empirical findings from a study
of economic recovery from natural disasters in regional
communities commissioned by the Regional Australia In-
stitute (RAI, 2013). The findings discussed in this section
distil key themes that emerged across the case studies.
6.1. Draw Card Business Provide an Important ‘Pull’
Factor
Oneof the key themes to emerge fromall three case stud-
ies was that current government recovery policy did not
understand or address the complexity of economic recov-
ery. As one Marysville resident succinctly observed, ‘The
businesses had been forgotten about and not really con-
centrated on in relation to the recovery’.
Marysville struggled with the circular challenge that
without businesses, tourists will not come and people
will not invest in businesses without a market to justify
the return. Business owners experienced a ‘grace’ period
of support but knew thiswould be short-lived; ‘Yeah look,
it’s probably been crunch time the last six months be-
cause...you can only feed on so many years of sympathy.
You’ve actually got to put up a product’.
The Marysville case study indicated that certain busi-
nesses were key ‘drawcards’ for tourists to the town and
they played an important role in spurring economic re-
covery; ‘You need to work out and highlight who are
your champion businesses...because you need to sup-
port those businesses’. The absence of those drawcard
businesses caused significantwider impacts than just the
immediate fire damage; ‘A lot of the attractions that
were up here then (after the fires) didn’t bring guests up,
tourists up to the area. So it was just the sum of all those
had a huge effect’. Marysville residents noted that the
artist café and local patisserie shop were attractions that
tourists specifically cited as reasons for visiting; ‘I remem-
ber bed and breakfast people coming and asking me—
are you staying? Because if you’re not staying, there’s
nothing left here and you know that we need something
straight away’ (Marysville business owner). Cardwell res-
idents similarly emphasised the ‘drawcard’ nature of lo-
cal environmental attractions, ‘Because of the damage
to Port Hinchinbrook and to the wharf and to the island,
with the complete destruction of the resort on the island,
the whole tourism industry was severely affected’.
The ‘drawcards’ in Marysville and Cardwell formed a
fundamental aspect of those regions’ identity and eco-
nomic rationale. Their loss had significant impact at a psy-
chological as well as functional level as it came to symbol-
ize the broader disaster impact on the region. In contrast
Emerald, which had a diversified economy and key indus-
tries largely unaffected by the disaster, was well placed
to recover rapidly from the flood’s impacts.
The inter-relationship between business reopening
and resident decisions to return to a disaster-affected
area has been well researched internationally. However,
in the absence of a viable market, businesses are less
inclined to re-establish themselves after a disaster. Pro-
moting the rapid recovery of housing, alongwith keeping
residents in the local area during the rebuilding process
is central to facilitating business recovery.
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6.2. Population Displacement and the Adaptation
Paradox
One of the critical impacts of disasters on a local econ-
omy is the destruction of housing. An immediate flow-on
effect is population displacement in the affected region.
As the experience ofMarysville clearly demonstrates, the
longer residents are displaced the less likely they are to
return. Of the 90% of residents who lost their housing,
over 50% have not rebuilt in the region (ABS, 2011; BCG,
2009). It was argued by many remaining residents that
had it not been for the temporary village that was estab-
lished post-disaster, the population exodus would have
been greater.
In the aftermath of Tropical Cyclone Yasi, a signifi-
cant proportion of the local population decided not to re-
turn to Cardwell. This decision was influenced by factors
such as damage to residences, loss of employment and
perceptions about Cardwell’s prospects. As one resident
noted, ‘A lot of the young families left because there was
no work’. Similar concerns were expressed in Emerald,
with a local real estate agent noting, ‘because of the pub-
licity of the fact that the whole of Emerald was flooded,
therefore nobody wanted to buy in Emerald’.
A critical issue highlighted was the negative impact
of this population loss on the community and economy
of Cardwell. As the population declined so too did the
business opportunities, leading to further job losses and
further population loss as job seekers move elsewhere.
One Cardwell resident summed up the issues as follows;
‘Well there is a decrease in houses. Leads to a decrease
in population and a decrease in jobs…leads to a decrease
in population. That means a decrease in teachers for
the school. Just everything decreases, a total decrease
in the town’.
A related dilemma is the role of property investors
and ‘part time residents’ in rural areas. Many ‘part-time
residents’ and investors may deem rebuilding a ‘bad
bet’ after catastrophic natural disasters. The absence of
rental housing stock places significant pressure on a local
economy, particularly in light of a reconstruction boom.
By way of example, ‘part-time residents’ provided nearly
10% of Marysville’s income. In Cardwell, Emerald and
Marysville, the loss of rental housing stock saw rents
spike through the reconstruction boom.
Due to the extensive reconstruction required in Card-
well, the reconstruction phase saw a significant influx
of construction workers. This was further augmented
by the large infrastructure development projects under-
way in the surrounding region. One Cardwell resident ob-
served that, ‘They needed accommodation and with all
the rebuilding done and the highway work, there’s an
influx of workers, that put the rents up very high’. The
combination of damaged housing supply and a surge in
demand saw rental prices spike. This resulted inmarginal
populations, such as those who had lost their jobs due to
local business interruption, being forced out of the rental
market. ‘I think we’re suffering with the extra workforce
because you’ve got a phenomenon then. They come in,
they put their price on, and in that price, they put phe-
nomenal rents. A lot of our local people that’s been here
all the time are struggling to find somewhere to rent
that’s affordable.’ (Cardwell Resident). Consequently, the
reconstruction process served to exacerbate the popula-
tion displacement problems experienced in Cardwell.
6.3. The Reconstruction ‘Mirage’
In the aftermath of a major disaster, the reconstruction
stage of recovery generally drives a significant influx of
construction workers to an affected region. The experi-
ence in Cardwell highlighted the change in the regional
employment profile during this stage. The reconstruc-
tion boom often distorts measures of a region’s eco-
nomic performance and obscures the long-term chal-
lenges faced in achieving sustained economic recov-
ery. The reconstruction boom can also have the unin-
tended consequence of furthering population displace-
ment, highlighted by this observation from a Cardwell
resident; ‘I don’t knowwhat Cardwell’s going to do when
this work’s finished. There’ll be a lot of empty houses,
I think’.
In Marysville and Cardwell, the reconstruction boom
drove demand for housing in a market with reduced
stock causes rental prices spike, serving to push out lo-
cal residents in marginal financial circumstances and key
workers (see also Yates, Randolph, & Holloway, 2006).
Those most at risk are residents whose employment or
employment opportunities have been compromised by
interruptions to business operations. The boom of activ-
ity driven by reconstruction is frequently a mirage that
masks a longer-term decrease in population and broader
business performance issues. The data from the case
study locations supports this observation; reconstruc-
tion activity does not equate to overall economic recov-
ery (see Table 1 above). Residents in Emerald were highly
critical of the outsourcing of repair work to non-local
businesses, noting:
“It’s an absolute slap on the face for the community
that has rallied to try and save the community....It
stood out. Everybody saw it. Especially when you’ve
got a community that has got all those people, qual-
ified people, sitting here, who dealt with it [previous
flooding] back in 2008, know exactly what has to be
done, and has the resources and has the absolute
need to have a job, needs an income in this commu-
nity and they go out of town to get someone else
in here.”
Although Queensland and Victorian government recov-
ery plans identified long-term outcomes, the experience
of residents in affected communities is of a short-term
focus on reconstruction. Respondents in the three case
study areas expressed deep fears about what would hap-
pen after the reconstruction boom ended. Residents in
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disaster affected areas were acutely aware of the recon-
struction mirage, directly linked to the masking effect of
the reconstruction boom. The dispersion of authority for
managing recovery due to the short remit of previous re-
covery agencies adds to their sense of short-term focus.
Another aspect of the ‘reconstruction mirage’ faced
by Marysville was the Government’s commitment to
building ‘things’ to demonstrate action on restoring the
town. As one resident noted, ‘I think it’s seen a bit cyni-
cally by a lot of people at themoment because there’s all
this fantastic infrastructure and there’s no-one to use it’.
The highway reconstruction in Cardwell was a simi-
larly hot-button issue for residents. ‘The highway was re-
opened, of course, pretty quickly, but it’s not been recon-
structed to appropriate standards.’ Residents criticised
the speed to rebuildwithout giving serious consideration
to ‘betterment’ of the asset through improvements such
as laying a new route and improving the carrying capacity
of the road.
There is a difficult balance to strike between gov-
ernment taking action to break the negative conse-
quences of population displacement and investing in
‘things’ that exacerbate the reconstruction boom yet fail
to support long-term community adaptation. The hotly
debated new community centre in Marysville embod-
ies this problem; many residents feel it is unnecessary
and under-utilised asset. An excessive focus on building
‘things’ appears to have resulted in over-expenditure on
infrastructure that does not serve the community’s long-
term needs, as it is not integrated with longer-term eco-
nomic recovery strategies. Early commitment to rebuild-
ing ‘things’—under political pressure to be seen to be do-
ing something—also tends to lock-in pre-existing vulner-
abilities; opportunities to fundamentally redesign the fu-
ture of a disaster-affected region may be missed.
7. Aligning Recovery within a Resilience Framework
The contracting adaptation spiral (Figure 2), depicts the
process bywhich a business adapts to a shrinking popula-
tion and, in so doing, exacerbates the problem. Beneath
the surface issue of population loss lies a marked change
in the demographic composition of the remaining pop-
ulation. As economic opportunities decrease, working-
age residents leave the region, meaning that the remain-
ing population becomes older, generally with lower dis-
posable incomes, thereby simultaneously decreasing the
economic productivity and increasing the vulnerability of
the region. Marysville and Cardwell both exhibited this
cycle. Emerald, with a diversified economic base and a
strong mining sector, was able to rebound and grow.
The contracting business and population spiral is a
logical system response to a major shock and represents
adaptation. It exposes the bias inherent in how the term
‘adaptation’ is deployed in disaster policy. Adaptation is
often positively connoted—implying there will be popu-
lation growth, improvement in GDP and general improve-
ment in the viability of a given region. At a whole-of-
system level, by reducing exposure to disasters and the
population broadly leaving an unproductive/unsuitable
area to seek opportunities elsewhere, the reduction in
population size and GDP of the region also represents
adaptation. It does not, however, represent ‘recovery’
through a short-term policy lens.
Researchers in the field of disaster management ar-
gue that there has been toomuch emphasis on response
and too little investigation of the economic impacts of
disaster and disaster recovery (see, for example, Kapucu
& Liou, 2014, p. 2). As noted above, the potential for
more holistic approaches to resilience to be embedded
as a key element at all phases of the ‘hazards cycle’ or
PPRR framework (see Tierney, 2013) has been identified
as an important direction for future research.
This insight, and calls formore integrated approaches
that link disaster management and development, are
supported empirically in the Australian context. Our case
studies show economic recovery is largely overlooked
compared to other recovery streams. In Marysville, for
example, governments collectively spent AUD$135 mil-
lion (USD$145 million) on infrastructure and other com-
munity recovery activities. In contrast AUD$2.77 million
(USD$2.23 million) was provided in direct grants to busi-
nesses through the NDRRA. This trend was repeated in
the other case study communities. Despite the emphasis
in official plans and documents on the inter-relationship
of all the strands of recovery, there was disproportion-
ate emphasis on the engineering resilience approach
of physical reconstruction. Opportunities for redevelop-
ment that might have reflected community values and
priorities for future development were not grasped be-
cause there had been no pre-event planning to engage
the community in contemplating alternative futures—an
adaptive resilience approach.
The Negave Adaptaon Spiral
Disaster impact
Populaon leaves
Reduced cash ﬂow
Cut back staﬀ &
staﬀ hours
Populaon leaves
Business leaves
Reduced market size
Reduced employment
opportunies
Figure 2. The Contracting Adaptation Spiral.
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Communities with high levels of social capital are bet-
ter placed to overcome problems of collective decision-
making and support economic recovery (Chamlee-
Wright & Storr, 2010; Norris et al., 2008). The inter-
connectedness of a community with high social capital
enables greater information sharing that will therefore
provide individuals with more information of other peo-
ple’s intentions from which they can shape their own
decision-making (Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2010; Storr
& Haeffele-Balch, 2012). Kapucu et al. (2013, p. 357)
describe this ‘community capital’ as embracing the ele-
ments of social capital, human capital, economic capital
and natural capital. They argue:
“Where a community chooses an adaptive rather
than an engineering resilience approach, disaster re-
silience is considered a function of the community’s
adaptive capacity. This capacity helps the commu-
nity engage in adaptive management and continuous
learning through an adaptive governance process. In
this framework, there is a reciprocal relationship be-
tween adaptive capacity and community capital.
Adaptive learning enhances community capital and
helps develop local capacity. This in turn influences
disaster resilience through mitigation and prepared-
ness that enables a more effective response to and
recovery from disasters.”
In Australia, the NDRRA’s focus on reconstruction, the
very limited uptake of the betterment provision, and
the lack of integration between the phases of the
PPRR framework, means that current arrangements do
not support—arguably they inhibit—longer-term adap-
tation. In the absence of strategic planning that might
support adaptive resilience, the primary focus in the
wake of a severe disaster event becomes reconstruction
and the need to restore critical infrastructure such as
power, telecommunications (including internet access,
electronic banking and electronic funds transfer), along
with rail and road networks. The ‘policy window’ that the
‘focusing event’ of a disaster presents for change (King-
don, 2013) cannot be seized in the absence of broad,
clearly articulated and integrated community and eco-
nomic development plans. This requires greater engage-
ment of local communitymembers in planning processes
that canvas the range of risks and hazards that it faces.
Kapucu and Liou (2014) highlight institutional mem-
ory of previous disaster events as a capacity-building
resource that supports self-organisation and thus in-
creased resilience.
Given the ‘pull’ factor exerted on community recov-
ery decision-making by economic recovery, current pol-
icy settings’ failure to support economic recovery has
significant long-term implications. Research into post-
disaster psychological/emotional recovery at the indi-
vidual and community level has highlighted the impor-
tance of economic functions to broad community recov-
ery (Norris et al., 2008). Narrow economic bases with
high levels of income inequality are correlated to poor in-
dividual and community recovery (Adger, 2000; Norris et
al., 2008). A community’s resilience, and its correspond-
ing ability to adapt post-disaster, is underpinned by its
economic base (Norris et al., 2008; Vigdor, 2008).
The distinctions drawn between community recov-
ery and economic recovery, and the seeming lack of fo-
cus on economic recovery, miss the vitally important—
indeed, the reciprocal link—between the two areas.
Community recovery will not occur without economic
recovery. In the absence of an adapted and function-
ing economy, a disaster-impacted region will remain in
a state of post-disaster dysfunction (Norris et al., 2008).
8. Conclusion: Towards Adaptive Resilience
The increasing frequency and cost of disaster events
is among the strongest arguments for policy-makers to
embrace an adaptive over an engineering resilience ap-
proach that is primarily focused on reconstruction. Dis-
aster events are likely to increase in the future not only
because of climate change, but also because of socio-
economic developments such as increased density of
settlements, particularly cities, population increase and
the increased numbers of settlements in coastal areas
(Latham, McCourt, & Larkin, 2010).
Beyond the financial considerations, there is a strong
link between risk reduction strategies and the develop-
ment of community resilience (Council of Australian Gov-
ernments, 2011). Australia’s NSDR notes that risk reduc-
tion strategies include ensuring infrastructure and public
assets are able to withstand the range of risks and haz-
ards identified in a community’s risk and hazard profile.
Despite good intentions and because of the focus on
relief and reconstruction activities, potentially positive
outcomes from the recovery experience often are not
realized. Recovery needs to be an adaptive process be-
tween the experiences of disaster-affected communities,
their evolving vision for their future, and their ability to
translate this vision into reality. Greater attention to com-
munity planning processes in the anticipatory, or preven-
tion and preparedness phases would provide a shared
basis for decision-making in the aftermath of a disaster.
A community-led renewal planning process that rec-
ognizes the specific local and regional context, along
with significant support from government agencies, non-
government organizations and industry experts, is likely
to be more effective than the current recovery process
in supporting adaptive resilience, both in terms of out-
comes and costs to governments. An integrated national
policy and funding framework needs to incentivise proac-
tive investment and planning at the community level
for anticipatory resilience, and incorporate development
across all other phases of the PPRR framework.
The lesson from major disasters in Australia is that
the laudable aspirations of theNSDR need to bematched
by actions to achieve its strategic intent. A resilient Aus-
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tralia requires policy and funding frameworks that are
consistent with the objective of promoting greater in-
dividual and community resilience. Current policy and
funding frameworks reinforce the traditional emphasis
on response and recovery. We have argued instead for
a focus on adaptive resilience. This implies greater in-
vestment in mitigation and adaptation strategies—to
non-structural (that is human-centred) resilience plan-
ning, not the predominant engineering resilience ap-
proach. Our Australian case studies lend empirical sup-
port to integrated frameworks that seek to build adap-
tive resiliency.
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